This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in economies where the expansion of investment is facilitated by securitization. We show that the use of securitization is generally associated with constrained inefficient aggregate investment, thereby justifying regulatory intervention in markets for securitized assets. We examine the effectiveness of three policy instruments to address this inefficiency: ex-ante capital / leverage requirements, skin-in-the game (retention) requirements and initiatives to improve transparency in the securitization process. We find that leverage/capital restrictions and improved transparency can increase welfare in our environment, but that forcing originators to hold additional skin-in-the game can never increase welfare.
Introduction
Securitization refers to the process by which financial intermediaries transform illiquid assets, such as corporate loans or mortgages, into marketable securities. As a result, securitization allows loans which were traditionally held to maturity by originators, to be sold (at least in part) as securitized assets to outsiders. Typically, a special purpose vehicle (SPV) is set up by a sponsoring financial intermediary, which purchases a pool of assets from the sponsor and/or other originators. These purchases are financed by sales of asset-backed securities (ABS) to institutional investors, that are backed by the cash-flows from the pool. One of the appeals of ABS is that they can be designed to suit institutional investors' preferences for relatively safe assets. The rise of this originate-to-distribute model has led to significant alterations in global capital markets and the nature of financial intermediation. In the US for example, non-agency ABS outstanding grew from approximately $11.3 billion in 1986 to over $1.36 trillion in 2015, and coincided with the increase of specialty non-bank lenders such as Countrywide Financial. Despite a number of flaws in the securitization process, highlighted in the fallout of the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] , growth in securitization is generally viewed as having increased overall credit availability and lowered the cost of credit in advanced economies.
1
Financial intermediaries value securitization because it allows them to alter the size and composition of their balance sheets when markets for the underlying assets are incomplete. Specifically, motivated by standard liquidity / risk-management considerations or binding regulatory requirements, intermediaries can use securitization to shed asset risk. This allows them to re-deploy capital towards alternative, possibly more profitable, investment opportunities. However, as is well known from the theoretical literature, competitive equilibria can exhibit excessive aggregate investment when markets are incomplete.
2 Thus, while securitization may raise investment through enhanced risk-sharing, it may cause over-investment, and as such the welfare implications of securitization are unclear. The main contribution of this paper is to show that aggregate investment is always constrained inefficient in economies where securitization is useful in expanding investment. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of investment with three periods (t = 0, 1, 2). In period 0, risk-neutral borrowers with limited capital, whom we refer to as intermediaries, finance risky investment projects by creating and selling safe debt (ABS) backed by the investments' cash-flows. Investment returns are subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. In creating safe debt, intermediaries are limited by their capital and the riskiness of returns as they retain residual risk. Projects may succeed early (period 1) yielding complete returns, or partly succeed late (period 2) yielding partial returns, or fail late returning nothing. The overall fraction of intermediaries' projects that succeed is uncertain, and depends on the underlying state of the economy. By engaging in securitization at period 0, individual intermediaries can shed idiosyncratic risk, thereby increasing their capacity to create and issue safe debt. Importantly, and in line with empirical evidence, we assume that frictions in the securitization process limit the amount of idiosyncratic risk that intermediaries can shed. This is modeled in the form of a skin-in-the-game constraint on originators. Thus, while ex-ante homogeneous, intermediaries will differ at period 1 as returns on their individual investments may be early or late, with the degree of heterogeneity dependent upon the amount of securitization at t = 0.
3 At period 1, we assume those with early returns (early types) always have sufficient funds to service their debt obligations and invest in new opportunities. On the other hand, if there is a recession late types require outside funding to undertake new investment opportunities and service debt. Financial frictions rule out state-contingent contracts at period 0, and new borrowing at period 1 (investor preferences rule out default). To raise funds, late types sell their late investments to early types via a spot market (fire-sale). However, they may be constrained in their ability to raise funds, in which case they will have to forgo new positive NPV investments (credit-crunch). The extent to which late borrowers are constrained will depend directly on their investment and securitization decisions at time 0, and indirectly through the prevailing asset price, which is a function of both the aggregate funds early types have (demand), and the aggregate quantity of assets for sale (supply). Crucially, as atomistic intermediaries do not anticipate the impact of their period 0 decisions on the asset price at period 1, a pecuniary externality arises that results in socially excessive investment and securitization at time 0 whenever late types are constrained at period 1. In fact, we show that the reduction in return variability via securitization is only valuable when late types are constrained, which is precisely when aggregate investment in the economy is constrained inefficient.
To better understand the role of securitization in our model, note that a reduction in the variability of asset returns via securitization mitigates the impact of financial frictions by moving funds from early to late types at period 1. This substitutes for contingent contracts or direct borrowing, which might otherwise provide such transfers but are assumed to be unavailable. As a result, intermediaries can create more safe debt for investors by increasing pledgeable income when asset returns are late. This is the standard partial equilibrium view of how more securitization can lead to higher leverage and investment.
4 However, our framework is novel in that it highlights an aspect of securitization previously unstudied; that securitization also affects spot market prices by altering the distribution of cash in the market. Specifically, with more securitization at period 0, demand for assets at time 1 declines since the funds of early types are reduced. On the supply side, late types require less funds and have more assets to sell. Overall, we show there is a reduction in the price of assets at period 1, creating a transfer from late to early types and thereby exacerbating the financial frictions and the pecuniary externality. Another key contribution of this paper is that it provides a framework to analyze the welfare implications of policies designed to curb excessive leverage and limit securitization in the financial sector. We show that leverage restrictions, akin to those outlined in the Basel III reforms, can be welfare improving when the competitive equilibrium is characterized by over-investment. Importantly, since securitized lending is at the heart of the (mostly unregulated) shadow banking sector, our results suggest broader regulation of the financial industry may be valuable.
It is plausible that welfare could be improved by recently enacted policies forcing originators to hold more skin-in-the-game, since securitization affects leverage indirectly. For example, the retention requirements specified in the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act and the European Capital Requirements Directive. These policies are interesting not only because they are a part of the current policy discussion, but because they also apply to both regulated and unregulated entities. It is also reasonable to assume that they require significantly less information than direct restrictions on the balance sheet, such as capital or leverage constraints. In our model, the total effect of forcing more skin-in-the-game can be decomposed into a direct effect and a price effect. There is a direct tightening of the constraints on late intermediaries, which reduces the resources available to intermediaries in a bad state of the world, causing them to reduce leverage ex-ante. On the other hand, reduced aggregate investment increases the price of assets in a fire-sale, which in turn increases the returns to intermediaries in the fire-sale and results in increased leverage. The direct effect is obvious and provides an intuitive rationale for tightening constraints as a means to reduce excessive investment. However, this is undone by the price effect, leaving the negative impact of the tighter constraint to dominate. This makes clear that the rationale for policies to increase skin-in-the-game as a means to reduce excessive leverage cannot rely solely on partial equilibrium arguments.
Finally, we consider the effect of policies aimed at improving transparency in securitization markets. Such policies can be interpreted as reducing the required skin-in-the-game, which is welfare-improving in our environment in the absence of implementation costs. Thus, through the lens of this model at least, it would seem that efforts to improve transparency conflict with policies forcing originators to hold more skin-in-the game.
Related Literature
This paper presents a novel model of a fire-sale induced credit-crunch. Unlike previous models, such as Lorenzoni (2008) and Stein (2012) , both demand (total cash held by early types) and supply (total assets for sale held by late types) in the fire-sale are endogenously determined in our framework. Endogenizing cash in the market is necessary to examine the ex-ante risk-sharing function of securitization. Thus, we are able to show that more securitization simultaneously increases the quantity of assets available for sale, while at the same time reducing funds available on the demand side. As a result, our model captures situations where outside liquidity is endogenously very limited, as we might expect in a severe financial crisis.
5
Our paper is most closely related to Gennaioli et al. (2013) , where the main role of securitization is also to pool idiosyncratic risk, allowing the financial sector to increase investment through higher leverage.
6 Our framework is a generalization of their benchmark model with rational expectations. The key difference is that we assume the existence of frictions in the securitization process that limit risk-sharing, which together with financial frictions lead to constrained inefficient competitive equilibria in our model. Gennaioli et al. (2013) focus on a different inefficiency associated with securitization, namely the inability of investors to recognize aggregate risk. However, under rational expectations, the use of securitization in Gennaioli et al. (2013) is completely efficient, whereas in our environment this is not the case. In fact, securitization is privately valuable in our environment only when aggregate investment is constrained inefficient. There is a growing literature on securitization, which for the most part focuses on security design and the contractual features arising from asymmetric information. For example, DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) examine security design problems in static settings whereas Hartman-Glaser et al. (2012) focus on a dynamic problem. Hanson and Sunderam (2013) consider a security design problem incorporating endogenous information 5 For example, in the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the lack of outside capital was partly evidenced by the US government's decision to rescue institutions through mergers rather than seeking recapitalizations.
6 Diamond (1984) first showed risk-pooling by financial intermediaries can increase investment and welfare.
acquisition by investors. Shleifer and Vishny (2010) develop a novel model of securitization where intermediaries sell assets to maximize fee revenue from intermediation. In contrast, this paper focuses on the general equilibrium effects of securitized lending and the associated welfare implications, taking the inefficiencies in the securitization process as given. Gale and Gottardi (2015) also examine the impact of pecuniary externalities on ex-ante capital structure of intermediaries. Debt is preferable to equity in their model due to tax advantages, and they identify the impact of fire-sales by bankrupt firms on the ex-ante capital structure. Our paper differs in that we abstract from tax advantages of debt and the possibility of default in equilibrium, while focusing instead on the role of securitization on ex-ante capital structure. Finally, this paper is related to the extensive literature on pecuniary externalities which arise from incomplete markets. This literature goes back to the seminal work of Hart (1975) , Diamond (1980) , Stiglitz (1982) , Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) . In our application, market incompleteness precludes individuals from equalizing marginal returns to investment. This is similar to the type of friction studied in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , Gromb and Vayanos (2002) , Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) , Allen and Gale (2004) , Lorenzoni (2008) , Farhi et al. (2009 ), Davila et al. (2012 , and He and Kondor (2016) , among others.
7 This paper shows how pecuniary externalities may result in inefficient investment when the securitization process is plagued by frictions. Thus, we link the literature on investment with incomplete markets and asset securitization. This allows us to study welfare and examine policies in a well-understood framework.
Model
We consider a three-period economy (t = 0, 1, 2), populated by a measure one of both investors and intermediaries.
Investor's Problem
Investors are endowed with wealth w at t = 0, and have preferences:
where c 0 is consumption at t = 0, c 2,ω is consumption at period 2 in state ω ∈ Ω, and β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. These preferences for investors are similar to those in Stein (2012) and Gennaioli et al. (2013) , and capture evidence that a large class of investors that purchase ABS, such as pension or mutual funds, have a strong desire for safety. 8 Investors do not have direct access to investment opportunities, but can save by purchasing safe debt claims, as well as risky assets from intermediaries. As we show in the next section however, they do not purchase any risky assets in equilibrium. We denote investors' purchases of safe debt (savings) by B, which pays a gross return r per unit at t = 2. 9 Debt purchases are chosen to maximize (1), subject to the following budget constraints at t = 0, 2:
Intermediary's Problem
Intermediaries are risk-neutral and endowed with k resources at t = 0. For simplicity, we assume that intermediaries do not discount the future, and so are indifferent between consumption at t = 0, 1, 2. Each intermediary has access to risky investment projects at t = 0, which can either succeed and return R 0 , or fail and return nothing. Projects may succeed early at t = 1, or late at t = 2, and returns are subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. The probability of success at t = 1 is identical and independent across intermediaries and varies with the aggregate state ω at period 1, where ω ∈ Ω ≡ {g, b}. The state g captures a "good" or growth state where intermediaries' projects are successful, whereas b captures a "bad" state where relatively few intermediaries' projects succeed. The probability that the good state occurs at t = 1 is q 1 , while the probability of the bad state is 1 − q 1 . We assume that all projects succeed early if the state is good at t = 1, whereas only a fraction α < 1 succeed early if the state is bad. Moreover, remaining projects provide only a fraction θ < 1 of their original return upon success.
10 The probability that remaining projects succeed at t = 2 depends on the aggregate state ω at t = 2, which may also be either good or bad. The probability of success at t = 2 is equal to 1 if the good state occurs, et al. (2011) , as well as Stein (2012) and Gennaioli et al. (2013) for discussions on the desire for safety by institutional investors that represent savers. A demand for safety can also be interpreted as a convenience yield if there is a demand for the use of ABS as collateral in sale and repurchase agreements, see Gorton and Metrick (2012) .
9 The use of short-term safe debt generates qualitatively similar results in our environment.
10 If we interpret intermediary investments as mortgages for example, then a bad state not only results in more failures, but the underlying homes may also be worth less. Alternatively, θ may capture early failures within an intermediary's portfolio of mortgages. Such early failures were characteristic of sub-prime mortgages issued in the United States prior to the recent crisis.
or 0 if the bad state is realized. The probability of the good state at t = 2, conditional on the good state at t = 1 is q 2,g , while the probability is q 2,b , conditional on the bad state at t = 1. Thus, the expected gross returns on period 0 investments at t = 0 can be written as
Projects that do not succeed at t = 1 become "impaired" in two ways, since the return upon success is reduced by (1 − θ)R 0 , and the probability of failure increases from (1
Each intermediary also has access to new risky investment projects at t = 1, that either succeed or fail at t = 2. The gross return per unit of investment is R 1 in the case of success and zero otherwise. We assume that returns on t = 1 investments are perfectly correlated across intermediaries, thus they all succeed if the state is good at t = 2 or they all fail if the state is bad at t = 2. Assuming that new investments are not subject to any idiosyncratic risk is not crucial, but allows us to focus on one round of securitization. Also, this implies that returns on new investments in the bad state at t = 1 are perfectly correlated with returns on existing investments. This captures evidence of increased correlation across asset returns in bad times.
Investment at any period requires intermediaries to incur non-pecuniary costs C(I). We assume C(·) is a strictly convex function such that C , C > 0 and C(0) = C (0) = 0. We interpret these costs as effort required to find and maintain quality investments, and assume these costs are small enough to ensure investment at t = 1 is always socially worthwhile.
This assumption allows for a credit-crunch at t = 1, which is necessary for the existence of a constrained inefficient equilibrium in our model. We discuss the importance of this assumption following Proposition 2.
At the start of t = 0, each intermediary invests I 0 while holding Y 0 in cash. Investments and reserves are financed with intermediary wealth k and through funds raised by issuing claims to investors. Intermediaries issue long-term risk-less debt D at t = 0, promising a gross return r at t = 2. They may also sell cash flows associated with S 0 ≤ (1 − a)I 0 units of their own investment, where a ∈ [0, 1) is an exogenous "skin-in-the-game" requirement limiting asset sales. We do not model the reasons for skin-in-the-game explicitly, but this can be justified by the existence of frictions in the securitization process, and/or regulatory requirements as discussed in Section 1.
11 By the same token, intermediaries can purchase 11 Skin in the game can arise as an optimal contractual arrangement due to informational asymmetries cash flows T 0 from other intermediaries. We interpret T 0 as the cash-flows derived from a pool of all other intermediaries' assets. Although an intermediary's own projects have the same expected payoffs per unit as the pool of other intermediaries' assets, due to diversification the latter bear no idiosyncratic risk, only aggregate risk. This is important because this diversification allows intermediaries to increase pledgeable cash-flows in the bad state when their asset returns may be late. In other words, cash-flows from the pool of assets T 0 provide better collateral than the cash-flows from the intermediary's own investment I 0 . Such collateral may be valuable if frictions limit the ability of intermediaries to raise funds. The purchases and sales of cash-flows by intermediaries are interpreted as a standard form of securitization. Each intermediary can be viewed as creating a "special-purpose vehicle" (SPV) that purchases a pool of intermediary assets and issues ABS. In this interpretation, intermediaries' retain the most junior "tranche" (equity) in the SPV while the senior "tranche" (safe debt) is sold to investors with a commitment by the intermediary to provide the SPV with a liquidity guarantee of rD. For ease of exposition, we refer to the junior tranche as ABS and the senior tranche as debt, however these can both be interpreted as ABS. Securitization in our model thus amounts to pooling idiosyncratic risk across intermediaries.
12
The decisions of intermediaries at t = 1 consist of investing in new opportunities, purchasing or selling securitized assets from other intermediaries, selling cash flows against their own t = 0 investments that have not yet been realized, or holding cash. In the good state, all intermediaries are identical as all t = 0 investments succeed and are realized early. As a result, there is no motive for trade, and each intermediary makes I 1,g new investments and holds Y 1,g in cash. In the bad state, early intermediaries have relatively more funds available for investment, and thus intermediaries with late returns may have access to relatively profitable investment opportunities that cannot be exploited. We denote early types by e and late types by l. Early intermediaries invest an amount I e 1,b at t = 1, while late intermediaries invest I l 1,b . Funds may be transferred between intermediaries through the exchange of assets or via the sale of remaining cash-flows on t = 0 investment. Importantly, given investors' preferences, intermediaries have no other means to generate funds from outsiders. 13 We also between originators of securities and outsiders, as modeled in DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) . This can arise in other interpretations, such as Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) , where this type of structure arises to address moral hazard. Cerasi and Rochet (2014) also provide a model of securitization of this type, in which banks hold an equity tranche to maintain proper incentives. 12 We do not distinguish between originating intermediaries, sponsoring intermediaries and "special-purpose vehicles" (SPV). Ignoring the difference between the latter two is not vital since these are typically artificial constructs, operating according to a set of pre-specified rules. We ignore the difference between the former two for tractability. A detailed discussion of the process can be found in Gorton and Metrick (2012) . 13 As t = 1 investments may yield nothing and investors are infinitely risk averse, they never lend additional funds at time 1. This can relaxed without altering the qualitative nature of our results, as long as the possibility that late intermediaries may be financial constrained is retained.
assume that funds can only be raised from other intermediaries via asset sales.
ASSUMPTION 2. (Market Incompleteness) Intermediaries cannot write state-contingent
contracts and cannot directly borrow and lend to each other at t = 1.
The missing markets we assume are a precondition for securitized lending in our model, since the existence of contingent securities at period 0 or frictionless borrowing at period 1 eliminates the value in securitizing assets. While we are agnostic about the specific market failure(s) that result in borrowing constraints, the literature has highlighted a number of possibilities.
14 Ruling out all borrowing at t = 1 is done for ease of exposition and is not vital for our results. A discussion on relaxing Assumption 2 can be found in Section 4.2.1. Denote early intermediaries' period 1 purchases of securitized assets by T 
where
The first term in (5), Π 1,g , is expected profit at t = 1 in the good state. In the good state, recall that all t = 0 projects succeed early and the proceeds are either re-invested in new opportunities, with gross expected returns q 2,g R 1 I 1,g − C(I 1,g ), or held as reserves, Y 1,g . Note that as intermediaries are all identical in this case, and each has sufficient funds to repay investors, there is no trade. The second term in (5) is expected profit at period 2 in the bad state. Expected profits are a weighted sum of early and late types' profits, Π 
Finally, the last two terms in (5) capture the costs of investment in the initial period, C(I 0 ), and debt repayment, rD. Intermediaries maximize (5) subject to the following set of constraints:
(λ
Inequality (6) is the budget constraint at t = 0, which requires investment costs, net purchases at price p 0 and reserves be no greater than equity and debt. Expressions (7)- (9) are the budget constraints at t = 1 in the good state, and for the early and late intermediaries in the bad state respectively. Early intermediaries projects have been successful, resulting in R 0 (I 0 −S 0 ) more funds than late types. They can use the returns from their individual investments, along with securitized assets, to purchase assets from late ones at a price p 1 or invest in new opportunities and reserves. Late intermediaries use returns from securitized assets, plus funds raised from asset sales, to finance new investment and reserves. Constraints (10) and (11) ensure that individual and securitized asset sales are feasible and satisfy the skinin-the-game requirement (we ignore the analogous constraints on early types since they are never binding in equilibrium). The final set of constraints are the intermediaries' collateral constraints that ensure debt is always repaid. 15 The solution to this problem is characterized in Appendix A, where the Lagrange multipliers associated with each constraint are given in brackets above.
Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the competitive market equilibrium. The intermediary problem is to choose investment, reserves, trade and debt levels to maximize expected prof-t=0 t=1 t=2
State is g I 1,g I 1,g succeeds and late assets succeed State is g (good), all projects succeed early:
Payoffs on all late assets and the t=1 investments are realized.
Debt is repaid, investors consume, intermediary earn profits. its subject to budget, collateral, sales, and investors' participation constraints. The investor problem is to choose how much debt and securities issued by intermediaries to purchase (if any), and savings to maximize expected utility of consumption subject to budget constraints. The price of debt, r, and the prices of securities p 0 , p 1 , are taken as given by intermediaries and investors. Our concept of equilibrium is characterized formally in the following definition. We now describe the optimal decisions of investors and intermediaries given prices, and then show how market clearing determines equilibrium prices.
Optimal Decisions of Investors
Investors save by purchasing claims from intermediaries. Since investors value risky assets at their lowest possible realization, they are priced out of the market for risky assets by intermediaries. More specifically, given that all risky investments may fail and return nothing, investors value these at 0 while intermediaries value them at their net present values. As a result, investors purchase only the risk-free debt issued by intermediaries if their break-even condition on funds lent, r ≥ β −1 , is satisfied. This participation constraint places a lower bound on the equilibrium interest rate with investors willing to supply funds inelastically as long as this condition is met. We summarize investor behavior in the Lemma below:
Optimal Decisions of Intermediaries
The following assumption allows us to focus on non-trivial equilibria in which intermediaries have incentives to borrow at t = 0.
Assumption 3 ensures that the marginal benefit of debt is positive when D = 0. This condition holds whenever t = 0 investment returns are sufficiently high. We use it to establish the following preliminary result.
LEMMA 2. In equilibrium, intermediaries do not hold cash reserves at t = 0 (Y 0 = 0), and 0 < D < w when investor wealth is sufficiently high.
Proof. See Appendix B.
It is never optimal for intermediaries to finance reserve holdings at t = 0 via debt. To see this, note that for every unit of debt raised at t = 0, intermediaries must generate r − 1 ≥ β −1 − 1 > 0 at t = 1 to service this additional unit of debt. Given Assumption 3, some debt is always valuable so that leverage is not zero. Returns to borrowing eventually become negative however, due to the convexity of investment costs, and thus there is a limit to the amount of resources intermediaries can absorb. We assume throughout the paper that w is sufficiently large to guarantee that all wealth is not absorbed, i.e., D < w + k.
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We now consider the optimal reserve holdings, trade and investment decisions by intermediaries at period 1, taking as given prices and period 0 decisions. Note that neither returns from new investments at t = 1, nor late returns on t = 0 investments can be pledged to repay investors at t = 2. This is because investors value these pledges at the lowest possible return, which is zero. Thus, intermediaries must carry reserves equal to at least rD into period 2 to ensure that debt is repaid irrespective of the state at t = 1. Next, consider trade between intermediaries. When the state at t = 1 is good, intermediaries are identical as all t = 0 investments succeed early, and hence there is no trade. In this case, intermediaries simply set aside the required reserves and invest the remainder in new opportunities since these are always worthwhile, from Assumption 1. Hence, I 1,g = R 0 I 0 − rD. In the bad state, intermediaries differ at period 1 in that the proportion α of intermediaries projects are successful. These early types receive the full return on the fraction of t = 0 investments that were not securitized. The fraction 1 − α of late types do not receive early returns on their own investments. Due to securitization, all intermediaries also receive a fraction of the early returns from other intermediaries' projects. For a given p 1 , early types can use their funds to either invest in new opportunities or purchase assets from late types. The amount of new investment, I e 1,b , equates the marginal return to investment with the marginal return on purchasing assets. The former is simply q 2,b R 1 − C (I e 1,b ), while the latter is q 2,b θR 0 /p 1 , as q 2,b θR 0 is the net present value on t = 0 investments in the bad state. Note that for higher values of p 1 , the return on purchasing assets is lower and therefore more investment is undertaken and fewer assets are purchased by early types. Analogously, for lower values of p 1 , early types purchase more assets, and invest less. The investment and sales decisions by late types involve a similar trade-off. By selling t = 0 assets, late types forgo the returns, but can increase new investment and/or generate reserves required to service debt. Sales consist of securitized assets on hand, −T l 1,b , as well as any of their own investments which were not sold at t = 0, S l 1,b . Late types may be constrained if they run out of assets to sell, in which case the multiplier on the sales constraints will bind (µ 1,S , µ 1,T > 0). LEMMA 3. Investment, sales and purchases of assets, and cash reserves in the bad state at t = 1 are as follows:
Early types:
As is clear from Lemma 3, if µ 1,T > 0, equilibrium investment levels will differ across types at t = 1. As a result, when late types are constrained at t = 1, intermediaries always find it optimal to securitize as much as possible. . Furthermore, when µ 1,T > 0, securitized assets are worth more than individual investments, since they provide relatively more resources to late types who value them more. As result, being constrained at t = 1 means that intermediaries will securitize to the extent possible at t = 0.
Finally, we describe the optimal choice of investment at t = 0, which is determined by the following first order condition on I 0 :
The marginal return to a unit of investment at t = 0, given that D > 0 is E π R 0 − r plus the marginal returns from re-investing early returns at t = 1. When the state at t = 1 is good, each additional unit of I 0 (financed by one unit of D) generates R 0 − r units of resources at t = 1 that can be reinvested for a net expected return q 2,g R 1 − 1 − C (I 1,g ). Similarly, when the state at t = 1 is bad, another unit of I 0 using borrowed funds generates R 0 − r units of resources for the early types and −r units for the late types. These can be reinvested at net returns of q 2,
. If the sales constraint binds at t = 0, increasing I 0 provides an additional benefit: it raises by (1 − a) units the quantity of assets late types can sell at t = 1, thereby mitigating the financial frictions intermediaries face at t = 1. Moreover, the value of relaxing the sales constraint (µ 1,S ) depends on the anticipated asset price p 1 . A higher price lowers this value while a lower prices raises it. Thus, when intermediaries are constrained, securitization affects the level of ex-ante investment through both the level of a and the price p 1 . The optimal choice of I 0 simply equates the marginal benefit of investment, the left hand side of (13), with its marginal cost, C (I 0 ). 
Market Clearing
From the optimal choices of investors and intermediaries, we can infer that r must satisfy the following bounds E π R 0 − C (k) ≥ r ≥ β −1 . Since demand for debt is downward sloping and supply is perfectly elastic at a price of β −1 , we have r = β −1 in equilibrium.
Consider the t = 0 market for securitized assets. It is shown in Lemma 4 that when constrained at t = 1, S 0 = T 0 = (1−a)I 0 . When unconstrained, intermediaries are indifferent over their choices of T 0 and S 0 . Regardless of the choices of T 0 and S 0 , any candidate equilibrium pricep 0 must clear the market, and thus S 0 (p 0 ) − T 0 (p 0 ) = 0. Inspecting the intermediaries' problem, it is clear thatp 0 has no effect on the budget, since all agents are identical and net purchases are zero. Thus optimal choices are determined by the first order conditions from the intermediaries' problem at a given p 1 , which are provided in Appendix A. The t = 0 price that clears the market satisfies
In an unconstrained equilibrium, p 0 = C (I * 0 ) /λ * 0 + 1 is simply the marginal cost of time 0 investment. When constrained, p 0 reflects the fact that securitized assets are relatively more valuable in this type of equilibrium, as they provide more resources to late types in the bad state of the world.
We now consider the determination of p 1 . From the optimal choices of intermediaries described in Lemma 3, we focus on prices in the range q 2,b θR 0 ≥ p 1 ≥ θR 0 /R 1 . To understand these bounds, note that if p 1 were to exceed the conditional return on assets, early types would not be willing to purchase them, since they can always invest in new projects that earn positive profit. Thus, at the equilibrium, assets will only trade at fire-sale prices (i.e. below NPV). On the other hand, if p 1 is below θR 0 /R 1 , early types do not make any new investments as buying up cheap assets is more profitable (and thus late types do not invest either).
18 The following proposition ensures the existence of a unique constrained equilibrium, which is the main focus of subsequent analysis.
PROPOSITION 1. Given Assumptions 1-3, a symmetric competitive equilibrium exists.
The equilibrium may be constrained such that µ 1,T > 0, in which case it is unique.
A sufficient condition for the existence of a constrained equilibrium is provided in the proof of Proposition 1. Intuitively, late types are constrained in equilibrium when the value of t = 0 assets is relatively low in the bad state (i.e. θ is small), t = 1 returns are high and/or when there is more heterogeneity across intermediaries at t = 1. Most importantly, the extent to which intermediaries can securitize assets also determines if late types will be constrained, and to what extent.
Welfare
In this section, we examine the efficiency of allocations at the competitive equilibrium. It is instructive to begin by characterizing the first-best allocation, as it helps to clarify the role of market incompleteness and securitization in the subsequent analysis.
First-Best
We consider a planner that maximizes total expected surplus in the economy subject to the participation of investors. We focus on the point of the first-best frontier at which investors receive a utility of w, the level they achieve in the market outcome. This is the simplest way to compare the allocations achieved by a planner, with those that result in the competitive equilibrium. Assuming that the planner places an equal weight on all intermediaries, the planner's problem is to choose aggregate quantities (15) subject to the participation constraint of investor, r = 1/β, and the following budget and debt repayment constraints:
We refer to the solution of this problem as the first-best, the salient features of which are outlined in the proof of the following result.
LEMMA 5. In the first-best, investment is equalized across intermediaries at t = 1 in every state.
The planner maximizes the profits of all intermediaries jointly subject to a single budget constraint in each state. This implies that investment by late and early types is always equated at t = 1 since investment technologies across intermediaries are identical and exhibit decreasing returns to scale. This first-best outcome can also be achieved in a decentralized competitive equilibrium when intermediaries can write contingent contracts at t = 0 to transfer resources from early to late types at t = 1. This is shown in the proof of Lemma 5. It is also straightforward to show that the first-best obtains in the case where a = 0, in which case securitization fully completes markets.
Incomplete Markets, Securitization and Efficiency
When the aggregate state or individual type information is not ex-ante contractible and borrowing ex-post is infeasible, markets are incomplete and late intermediaries that have insufficient funds to repay debt and invest are forced to generate funds via asset sales on the spot market. Securitization changes the distribution of returns at t = 1, moving resources from early to late types, thereby substituting for contingent contracts and limiting the need for asset sales. This is precisely how securitization substitutes for missing markets in our environment.
To understand the nature of the inefficiency associated with securitization in the competitive equilibrium, it is necessary to establish a welfare benchmark. Consider a planner subject to the same market restrictions as intermediaries. Such a planner cannot directly re-allocate funds from early to late types at t = 1 in the bad state. Instead, the planner must rely on asset sales to achieve re-allocations across types. As a result, the planner cannot always equalize marginal returns to investment across types at t = 1 as in the first-best allocation. Thus, a second-best planning problem is nearly identical to the intermediaries', except that the planner's choices at t = 0 reflect aggregate quantities and thus the planner can fully account for any price effects that the choice of these aggregates have on t = 1 decisions. As in Section 4.1, we fix investor utility to that which obtains in the market equilibrium, which constrains the price of debt to r = 1/β.
Rather than directly compare the competitive equilibrium with the second-best allocation, we take an alternative approach to establish the inefficiency of the market equilibrium. Consider a perturbation of aggregate investment at t = 0, at the competitive equilibrium, such that the change is equal across intermediaries. Such a perturbation is financed by borrowing from investors and thus raises leverage of the intermediation sector, but does not change r. Using the envelope theorem, the change in welfare from such a perturbation is:
If dΠ 0 /dI 0 = 0, the equilibrium is constrained inefficient and a planner could engineer a Pareto improvement, even when subject to the same market incompleteness as intermediaries. Equation (20) captures a price effect which represents the difference between the individuals' first order condition on t = 0 investment and that from the second-best planner's problem. 19 This price effect is non-zero when the marginal return on investment differs across early and late types, captured here by the difference in the date 1 multipliers on the intermediaries' budget constraints in the bad state, weighted by the relevant population sizes. This is true precisely when late types are constrained in their ability to raise funds at t = 1, i.e., λ
We summarize the above discussion in the following result.
PROPOSITION 2. If late intermediaries are constrained in their ability to raise funds, i.e., µ 1,T > 0, then the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient, in that a planner facing the same constraints as the private market can engineer a Pareto improvement. Moreover, assets are securitized if and only if aggregate investment is constrained inefficient.
The intuition behind the inefficiency is as follows. Generally, individual investment decisions at t = 0 impact the price of assets at t = 1 in the bad state. In the unconstrained case, price changes represent a redistribution of resources across intermediaries, which are irrelevant for welfare as they are risk-neutral. When µ 1,T > 0 however, the price of assets in the bad state at t = 1 affects the ability of late types to raise funds, which in turn impacts aggregate investment at t = 1. Since atomistic intermediaries do not take into account the effect of their t = 0 investments decisions on the t = 1 asset price, there is a pecuniary externality that renders the competitive equilibrium inefficient. Moreover, securitization is only valuable when the competitive equilibrium is inefficient, as this is precisely when intermediaries are constrained and value the additional ex-ante insurance that securitization provides.
Assumption 1 ensures that all intermediaries have access to positive NPV investments at t = 1. This is crucial for the existence of constrained inefficient equilibria characterized by over-investment. To see this, consider the case in which late intermediaries exhaust their investment opportunities at t = 1. In this case, they are not constrained and therefore no pecuniary externality exists. Now consider the other extreme case in which early intermediaries have no investment opportunities. In this case, early types value assets sold by late types at NPV or θR 0 /R 1 . Therefore, even though late intermediaries may be constrained in their ability to raise funds, no pecuniary externality can exist as changing t = 1 resource allocations cannot raise the price any further.
The following proposition characterizes the link between frictions in the securitization process and the efficiency of the competitive equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 3. When frictions associated with the securitization process are relatively small, the competitive market equilibrium is first-best. When frictions associated with securitization are sufficiently large, the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Formally, there exists an a ∈ (0, 1), such that for a < a, the competitive market equilibrium is firstbest, while for a > a, late types are constrained and the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient.
To understand this result, recall that the extent to which late intermediaries are constrained depends on a. When a large enough proportion of assets can be securitized, the late types will not be constrained in raising funds at t = 1. In this case, the marginal return to t = 1 investment is equalized across intermediaries and thus t = 0 decisions reflect the full social cost and benefit of investment (i.e., the allocation is first-best). In the extreme case in which a = 0, this is obvious since all assets can be securitized and thus intermediaries have the same resources at t = 1. On the other hand, if the frictions associated with securitization are sufficiently large, the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Importantly, in this case the competitive market equilibrium is not only inefficient relative to the first-best, but the second-best as well. Thus, micro level frictions in the securitization process lead to constrained inefficient investment at the macro level. We further characterize the nature of the inefficiency as follows. From Equation (20), it is clear that the sign of the inefficiency is determined entirely by the sign of dp 1 /dI 0 . To determine the sign of the price effect, note that αR 0 − 1/β is the marginal change in aggregate cash in the market at t = 1 in the bad state that arises from an additional unit of I 0 . If this is positive, an increase in I 0 increases cash in the market and puts upward pressure on the asset price, thus making dp 1 /dI 0 positive. The price impact from investment at t = 0 on cash in the market at t = 1 is not considered by atomistic individuals and as a result I 0 is too small from a social perspective. Analogously, if αR 0 − 1/β is sufficiently negative, more investment at t = 0 reduces cash in the market in the bad state of the world and this reduces the fire-sale price and results in over-investment.
Permitting Borrowing Between Intermediaries at t = 1
Assumption 2 is crucial to the inefficiency described in (20) . If intermediaries could pledge all cash flows to lenders at t = 1, the resulting equilibrium would be efficient. However, we can relax Assumption 2 without affecting the qualitative results of the model, as long as there is some restrictions on t = 1 borrowing. Consider a contingent contract in which the lender receives a gross per-unit return ρ when the borrowers' investment is successful and nothing otherwise. This is not restrictive since both parties are risk-neutral. Importantly, we assume that the borrower cannot commit to repayment at t = 2. Should the borrower attempt to renege, the lender could seize the fraction φ of the borrower's assets. Thus, borrowing B is limited to satisfy the following pledgeability constraint: ρB ≤ φ·(total assets at t = 2). Note that early types are both the purchasers of securitized assets as well as lenders, and that risk-neutrality ensures R 0 /p 1 = ρ.
As in the case with asset sales only, we can perturb aggregate investment at the equilibrium. Denote the multiplier on the pledgeability constraint by µ 1,b .
Equation (21) is identical to (20), except for the additional non-negative term µ *
in the square brackets. The price effects of changes in I 0 , which also affects ρ through the arbitrage condition in this case, have an impact on welfare whenever late types are constrained at the equilibrium. Thus, while borrowing may have quantitative implications, the externality is completely analogous since the pledgeability constraint binds if and only if the sales constraint binds.
Over-investment and Securitization
In this section we focus on over-investment, the case in which the competitive equilibrium is characterized by excessively high leverage ex-ante and low asset prices ex-post. We show below that increasing the amount of securitization that is feasible will further reduce prices in a fire-sale, thus it is reasonable to think that more securitization could be undesirable relative to the second-best. To formalize this type of argument, consider the impact of a change in a on the intermediary at the competitive equilibrium.
α dp 1 da .
First note that this derivative is zero in the unconstrained case. This is because investment at early and late types is identical when unconstrained, and thus an increase in a simply amounts to a redistribution of cash at t = 1 from late to early types (all of whom are risk-neutral). When constrained, the first term in the expression above is a direct effect, which is always negative and captures the fact that an increase in a restricts the ability of late intermediaries to generate funds at t = 1. The second term is an indirect effect, which captures the change in the equilibrium price due to changes in the distribution of cash-in-themarket at t = 1. The sign of the indirect effect is determined by dp 1 /da, since the bracketed term in (22) is strictly positive in a constrained equilibrium. If the price effect is negative, then a smaller value of a, i.e., more securitization, improves welfare unambiguously. On the other hand, if the price effect is positive and dominates the direct effect, less securitization leads to higher welfare. We show in the proof of Proposition 4 below that dp 1 /da is in fact positive in the over-investment case, but that the total effect of an increase in a is generally negative.
PROPOSITION 4. In the over-investment case, dp 1 /da > 0 and dΠ 0 /da < 0 at the equilibrium, i.e., welfare is increasing in the extent of securitization.
At a given price, an increase in a reduces investment at t = 0. This is because a higher value of a changes the distribution of cash in the market for a given I 0 , resulting in a greater proportion of returns for early types that value cash less in a constrained equilibrium. On the other hand, a reduction in I 0 puts upward pressure on the price of assets at t = 1. This price effect makes assets more valuable, encouraging higher I 0 , and opposing the direct effect described above. We are left with a somewhat counterintuitive conclusion; that more securitization leads to more investment/leverage, which is welfare improving even when investment/leverage is excessive.
Policy
The recent financial crisis has resulted in significant regulatory reforms worldwide, a number of which are directed at markets for securitized assets. The most important being the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, and the regulatory reform initiatives across the European Union.
20 There are many subtleties, and a number of differences in the reforms across jurisdictions. However, we can group these into two broad categories: retention and transparency requirements.
Retention requirements, set to 5% skin-in-the-game in the US and EU reforms, translate to imposing a higher level of a in our environment. 21 We have shown in Proposition 4 that increases in a are welfare-reducing in a constrained equilibrium, and have no welfare implications in the unconstrained case. This is true despite the fact that increased skin-inthe-game serves to reduce socially excessive leverage and raises prices in a fire-sale. Reforms directed at improving transparency in securitization markets, which generally focus on due diligence, disclosure and the role of credit rating agencies, can also be interpreted as impacting the market level of a in our model. Presumably, a more transparent market would serve to reduce the frictions associated with securitized lending. Thus, Proposition 4 would suggest these policies would be beneficial from a welfare perspective, absent any costs of implementation. Again, we emphasize that improvements in transparency lead to reductions in a are welfare improving when leverage is excessive, even though they will generate an increase in leverage and lower prices in a fire-sale. It is worth noting at this point that reducing frictions in securitization markets, while at the same time forcing originators to hold more skin-the-game, is somewhat contradictory. Our model suggests focusing on the former and eschewing the latter.
Our previous discussion applies to policies that are directly targeted at securitization. However, a number of regulatory reforms enacted as part of the Basel III agreement are also designed to limit excessive investment and/or leverage in the financial sector. One such reform is a restriction on leverage that is independent of asset risk. In our model, as ex-ante investment may be inefficient, a direct leverage restriction (or capital requirement as the two are equivalent in our model), can improve welfare. However, this type of regulation presents a number of practical difficulties that arise from asymmetric information between intermediaries and regulators.
22 Perhaps more importantly, many participants in securitization markets do not fall under the regulatory umbrella, i.e., are shadow banks. Thus, unlike the policies discussed above, tying the hands of regulated entities through leverage and/or capital controls would likely result in more resources flowing into the shadow sector. This would seem to be a major hurdle facing regulators going forward and represents an important area of further research. Another important policy-relevant aspect of the model is that the price of securitized assets at t = 0 is informative about the nature of the equilibrium at t = 1. As is clear from (14), it captures the costs associated with being constrained at t = 1. Thus, our model predicts that high prices for securitized assets today, that is the divergence of prices for securitized assets from fundamentals, predicts an inefficient fire-sale and a credit-crunch tomorrow. This is consistent with the behavior of prices for ABS before and after the recent crisis. As a summary of our results, we highlight the policy implications of the model in the following Proposition.
PROPOSITION 5. When the competitive equilibrium is characterized by over-investment:
• Welfare decreases when skin-in-the-game requirements are tightened. As a result, welfare is increased if more transparency reduces skin-in-the-game.
• Direct leverage restrictions are welfare increasing.
These results follow directly from the analysis in Section 4. The first point is simply a restatement of Proposition 4. To see the second point, note that a reduction in leverage in our framework is equivalent to a perturbation that reduces the initial investment I 0 , for all intermediaries. Equation (20) characterizes the welfare impact of a change in leverage, which is negative in the case of over-investment, as shown in the proof to Corollary 1.
Conclusion
We study the efficiency of competitive equilibria in an incomplete markets economy where securitization improves risk-sharing, and thus can raise overall investment. We find that by its very nature, securitization has unintended consequences that render the competitive market equilibrium inefficient. Specifically, while the additional insurance offered by securitization can increase overall investment, it may also lead to a pecuniary externality whereby the resulting expansion in investment is socially excessive. Two types of regulatory interventions can mitigate this over-investment problem: the imposition of direct leverage restrictions and/or transparency improvements in securitization markets. On the other hand, forcing issuers of securitized assets to hold more skin-in-the-game, which is currently an important part of regulatory reforms in the US and Europe, is never welfare improving.
A For Online Publication: Solution to the Intermediary Problem
The necessary conditions for the intermediary problem, given in (5)- (12), are as follows:
First consider the intermediaries' problem at t = 1, taking prices r, p 0 , p 1 , and quantities I 0 , S 0 , T 0 and D as given. Since intermediaries have access to positive NPV projects at t = 1 (Assumption 1), it follows from (27), (28), and (30) that the budget constraints bind: λ 1,g , λ 
We now pin down investment and trade. If the state at t = 1 is good, then all intermediaries are identical with resources R 0 I 0 − rD. There is no motive for trade since investment opportunities are identical, thus all intermediaries invest I 1,g = R 0 I 0 − rD. If the state at t = 1 is bad, early intermediaries' purchase assets at price p 1 according to (29) . Combining this with (28) and the corresponding budget constraint we obtain:
If late intermediaries can raise sufficient funds to repay D and to invest at t = 1, the sales constraint does not bind and thus µ 1,T = 0. In this case, the marginal returns on investment between early and late types are equalized and αλ (30) and (31) we can then write
Using (24), (25), and (28)- (31) the multipliers can be written:
To solve for the optimal choices at t = 0, note that the budget constraint binds, so that λ 0 > 0. Using (33) and (26), it is clear that if debt is positive (Lemma 2), then no cash is held. We can then recover the quantity of debt via the budget constraint for given I 0 , S 0 and T 0 so that:
Using the above results, the optimal choices of I 0 , S 0 and T 0 are then characterized by the corresponding first-order conditions ( 
B For Online Publication: Proofs Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. To show that intermediaries hold no cash at t = 0, combine (26) with ( , yields the expression in Assumption 3, which is sufficient for D > 0. Finally, to show that D < w + k for sufficient w, rewrite the necessary condition for an optimal I 0 , evaluated at I 0 = w + k.
Setting I e 1,b = 0, and
gives:
If (47) holds, then (46) must hold as well. From the first order conditions, we have
. Setting price at the upper bound p 1 = q 2,b θR 0 , and
Note that the bound on µ 1,S is not a function of w, while the other terms on the left hand side of (47) are strictly decreasing in w, and the right hand side is strictly increasing. Therefore, (47) must be strict for sufficiently large w.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The expressions for I 
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Equations (28) and (29) yield
Similarly, using (30) and (31) we have
Hence, µ 1,T = 0 ⇔ I (25) and dividing through by α(1 − α), we obtain
Now note that the square-bracketed term is proportional to ∆C ≡ C (I (25) and (32) we have:
Using (31) and (24) we have:
Note that the LHS is always non-negative and strictly positive only when µ 1,T > 0. Since the LHS is bounded below by a positive number as µ 1,S > 0, it must be the case that µ 1,T > 0. Finally, to show that S 0 = (1 − a)I 0 , and S l 1,b = 0, we add (23) and (25) to obtain [λ 0 (p 0 − 1) − C (I 0 )]/a = µ 1,S , when investment and sales are non-negative. This implies that p 0 > 1 + C (I 0 )/λ 0 . Hence, it is profitable to invest and then sell assets at t = 0. Thus, S 0 = (1 − a)I 0 , and therefore S l 1,b = 0 as there are no assets to sell at period 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Begin with the equilibrium at t = 1. At a price equal to NPV (p 1 = q 2,b θR 0 ), demand is zero because early types have access to positive NPV investments, while supply is positive for the same reason and thus excess demand is negative. At p 1 = θR 0 /R 1 , demand is positive since buying assets dominates investment for early types, while supply is zero, and thus excess demand is positive. We conclude that an equilibrium in the asset market at t = 1 exists since excess demand, characterized in (53), is a continuous function. Note that q 2,b θR 0 > θR 0 /R 1 = q 2,b θR 0 /q 2,b R 1 , since q 2,b R 1 > 1 by assumption.
Given arbitrary feasible t = 0 choices I 0 , T 0 , S 0 and D, excess demand at t = 1 is
where optimal t = 1 investment is characterized by (28)- (31) and we denote
in the unconstrained case. For prices at which sales are not constrained, we have
where the inequality follows from dI 1,b /dp 1 = q 2,b θR 0 /C (I e 1,b )p 2 1 > 0 and the fact that αR 0 (I 0 + T 0 − S 0 ) − rD − I 1,b ≥ 0, since aggregate investment cannot exceed aggregate resources at t = 1. When constrained,
where dI e 1,b /dp 1 = q 2,b θR 0 C (I e 1,b )p 2 1 > 0. Since excess demand is monotone in either case, the equilibrium at t = 1 is unique. We now consider t = 0. From (24) and (25), it is clear that for sufficiently low p 0 , S 0 = 0 and T 0 ≥ 0. Alternatively, for sufficiently high p 0 , T 0 = 0, while S 0 ≥ 0. Since excess demand is continuous, there exists an equilibrium p 0 that clears the market at t = 0. From the first order conditions on the intermediary problem we have
for non-negative values of T 0 and S 0 . In the unconstrained case, p 0 = C (I 0 )/λ 0 + 1, which is simply the marginal cost of investment. This price must obtain at the equilibrium since there is no collateral motive for securitized assets, which implies that supply is zero for any price lower and demand is zero for any price higher. In this case, p 0 = C (I 0 )/λ 0 + 1 and any value of S 0 = T 0 ∈ [0, (1 − a)I 0 ] represents an equilibrium. If the equilibrium is constrained, the price is determined by (56) and S 0 = T 0 = (1 − a)I 0 , by Lemma 4. To pin down the value of I * 0 , note that in equilibrium S * 0 = T * 0 so that from (23) we have that I * 0 is characterized as follows:
The solution to this equation exists due to Assumption 3 and is unique as the secondorder condition follows from C (·) > 0. In the unconstrained case, the optimal choice of I 0 is independent of S 0 and T 0 and is uniquely characterized by the following first-order condition:
Finally, we show that parameters exist such that the equilibrium may be constrained. Posit an unconstrained equilibrium. From (28)-(31), we have
where I 1,b = αR 0 I 0 − rD must hold to satisfy the aggregate resource constraint at the equilibrium. Substituting (59) into (9) gives aggregate supply
If parameters exist such that (60) exceeds (1 − α) 2 (1 − a)I 0 , then the equilibrium can not be unconstrained. Using I 0 − T 0 ≥ aI 0 , k + w > I 0 , and simplifying yields the following sufficient condition for aggregate supply to exceed (1 − α)
Since q 2,b R 1 − C (αR 0 (k + w) − β −1 w) > 1 due to Assumption 1, we can further simplify to obtain the following sufficient condition:
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We first outline the salient features of the solution to the planning problem described in (15)-(19). It is straightforward to show that all budget and debt repayment constraints bind, that no cash reserves are held at t = 0 and the interior solution is unique since −C (·) < 0. Combining the first order conditions on t = 1 investment in the bad state gives
Furthermore,
where we have used D = I 0 − k. Investments at t = 0 and t = 1 are thus related as follows:
The planner equates the marginal cost of investment at t = 0 with the marginal benefit of investment across the states at t = 1, where investments are equalized across intermediary types in the low state.
Contingent Securities
We now introduce contingent securities traded at t = 0, conditional on individual type at t = 1 when the state is bad (there is no gains from trading securities that pay off when the state is good since all intermediaries are identical in this state). Further, there is no motive for trade at t = 1 and we ignore this possibility. The security pays the owner one unit, conditional on the bad state if no early returns have been realized. Denote by ζ l and ζ e the quantities of this security purchased or sold, and ρ 0 the corresponding price. The intermediaries' problem is:
subject to:
All budget constraints bind, Y 0 = 0, and all collateral constraints will bind, so that
We can then rewrite the objective and obtain the following necessary optimality conditions:
Using (79) and (80), we obtain λ . Thus, trading securities at t = 0 permits agents to equate the marginal returns to investment at t = 1. Write the foc for I 0 after re-arranging terms as follows:
This is identical to (66), hence the market allocation when Arrow securities are traded is Pareto efficient.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Differentiating the Lagrangian for the intermediaries' problem with respect to aggregate I 0 yields
using the market clearing condition αT
. This is equation (20) in Section 4.2, which we provide here for convenience. Since the price effect in (82) is non-zero, the equilibrium is constrained inefficient whenever µ 1,T > 0.
To show that intermediaries value securitization only when the competitive equilibrium is inefficient, note that when unconstrained, µ 1,S = µ 1,T = 0, and I Thus, securitization has no value when intermediaries are unconstrained as its use cannot improve welfare. When intermediaries are constrained, securitization has value as I * 0 is then indirectly a function of p 1 via (13) as t = 1 investment is a function of p 1 .
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. It is straightforward to show that a constrained equilibrium is not possible for a sufficiently small value of a. In an unconstrained equilibrium, S 0 , S l 1,b and I 0 are not functions of a. Thus, assuming S 0 > 0, the sales constraint S 0 + S l 1,b ≤ (1 − a)I 0 implies that there is a unique 0 < a < 1 such that the intermediary is constrained whenever a > a.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. From (20), sign(dΠ * 0 /dI 0 ) = sign(dp * 1 /dI 0 ). Multiplying the market clearing condition at t = 1 by p * 1 and noting that T 
The denominator is strictly positive since q 2,b θR 0 C (I e * 1,b )p * 2 1 > 0 as C (·) > 0. Thus, the sign of dp * 1 /dI 0 is determined solely by the numerator. First, we characterize parameters to support the over-investment case. This case occurs when
Assume that (62) holds so that in equilibrium µ 1,T > 0. Then, a sufficient condition for overinvestment is that a+α(1−a) ≤ 1 βR 0 which ensures the LHS of (84) is 0. As p * 1 ≥ θR 0 /R 1 > 0 in equilibria with positive investment at t = 1, the condition ensures over-investment in equilibrium.
Under-investment occurs when the inequality in (84) is reversed. From (60) we have the following upper bound on the price in a constrained equilibrium:
Therefore, a sufficient condition for under-investment is aαR 0 (1 − α)(1 − a) < α ((a + α(1 − a))R 0 − 1/β) (1 − α) 2 (1 − a)
which is the expression in Corollary 1. Note that as (62) and the conditions for over-and under -investment must hold simultaneously, the former may be viewed as restrictions on R 0 or β.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Differentiating welfare with respect to a at the optimum we have 
= µ * 1,T I * 0 p * 1
(1 − α)(1 − a) dp * 1
where we have used (43), and T * 0 = S * 0 = (1 − a)I * 0 . We ignore the price effects arising from changes in p * 0 , since intermediaries have net zero sales at t = 0, and thus changes in p * 0 do not alter the budget and in turn do not affect investment or welfare. The t = 1 market-clearing condition, αT 
M l < 0 in the over-investment case. To see this, note that M l is strictly increasing in p 1 . Evaluating M l at the maximum constrained price p c = aαR 0 /(1−α)(1−a), which is described in (85). This gives M l (p c ) = αR 0 − β −1 , which must be negative in the over-investment case as shown in the proof of Corollary 1. Thus, both and φ are strictly positive and Ω < 1, implying dΠ * 0 /da < 0. Finally, if M > 0 and M l < 0, then ∂I * 0 /∂a < 0 and ∂I * 0 /∂p 1 > 0. From (90), it follows that dp 1 /da > 0.
C For Online Publication: Evidence on growth of ABS and safe instruments
The panels below provide evidence on ABS and Money Market Funds in the US and Europe respectively. The top left figure in the first panel below shows the amount of ABS outstanding in the United States over the period 1986-2015. As is clear, the supply of securitized assets has increased dramatically over this period, despite a slow-down following the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The data exclude securitized assets issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae. The top left figure shows the amount of ABS issued every year over the same period. The bottom left figure shows the amount of money market instruments outstanding in the United States over the period 1996-2015. This figure shows that demand for money-like instruments also dramatically expanded over this period. The bottom right figure plots the total ABS outstanding and the total money market funds. This shows that these two series have generally moved together over time, lending credibility to our assumption that the increased demand for safe (money-like) assets has contributed to the growth in ABS. The following figures show the corresponding data for Europe. 
